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The incomplete privatization of the electric sector in Peru provides a unique 
scenario for evaluating the impact of public versus private provision. The results 
in this paper suggest that management of electricity firms by the private sector 
leads to a significant improvement in the quality of the provision of electricity. 
These improvements in quality and supply of electricity provision yield some 
efficiency gains in terms of the time allocation of the working labor force that can 
be directly linked to the use of electricity. Rural households under private 
provision of electricity had more opportunities to work in non-farm activities, and 
as a result, the share of time in non-farm activities increased, indicating both a 
substitution effect and a potential price effect through higher non-farm wages. 
The substitution effect implies a reduction of hours spent on farm activities in 
favor of non-farm activities, and the price effect implies that households will 
receive higher salaries and therefore will need to work fewer hours in total. As a 
result, the increase in time spent on non-farm activities was accompanied by a 
reduction of hours spent on farm activities and an increase in hours spent on 
leisure. 
 
                                                           
1 We are indebted to the excellent research assistance of Lucia del Carpio, Roxana Fernández, Pamela Medina, and 
David Solis. Any correspondence should be sent to Maximo Torero at m.torero@cgiar.org. 4  
1. Introduction  
Since 1990, Peru has embarked upon a drastic stabilization and structural reform process 
comprising a vast program of privatizing state-owned enterprises, including the main electricity 
and telephone utilities. 
In the electricity sector, the government approved the Law of Electric Concessions (DL 
25844) in 1992, which separated power generation from transmission and electricity distribution, 
vertically unbundling the sector. Prior to the reforms, there were 12 state-owned distribution 
companies that were responsible for providing electricity service in Peru. In addition to the 
vertical unbundling, the reforms included the reformulation of tariffs based on marginal costs, 
the introduction of a scheme of regulated and non-regulated markets, and the privatization of 
some key electricity assets above. The government also created the Supervisory Agency for 
Private Investment in Energy (OSINERG) to regulate tariffs and to control the quality and 
quantity of combustibles and service provision.
2   
Between 1994 and 1997, the government privatized 10 state-owned enterprises—five in 
electricity distribution and five in electricity generation—for a total of US$1.43 billion. As a 
result of this privatization process, 66 percent of installed generation capacity (MW) was 
administered by the private sector by 2005, and 60 percent of production (GWh) and 61 percent 
of billing came from private companies. In terms of transmission, 100 percent of transmission 
was managed by private companies by the same year. The billing in this segment was US$122 
million. In sum, the private sector served 46 percent of the total number of clients in Peru by 
2005 and distributed 71 percent of the energy, which accounted for 67 percent of distribution 
billing.
3  
Privatization in the distribution segment led to investments of US$838.9 million between 
1994 and 2004, representing 61.27 percent of total investments reported in the same period 
(Appendix 1, Table A.1 details the investments that took place by company). As shown in Table 
1, by the end of 2005 Peru achieved a national electrification coefficient of 78.1 percent, up from 
the 56.8 percent reported in 1993, with generation capacity increasing by 67 percent during the 
same period. Electrification rates, however, still differ significantly among regions, in particular 
between the urban and rural sectors.  
                                                           
2 “What is OSINERG: Institutional Information.” http://www.osinerg.gob.pe/osinerg/informa/qosinerg.jsp). 
3 “Anuario Estadístico 2005.” OSINERG—Gerencia Adjunta de Regulación Tarifaría División de Distribución 
Eléctrica, 2006. 5  
 
 
Table 1. Peruvian Electricity Sector Main Indicators 
 
General Indicators  1993  2005 
Power capacity (MW)  4,282  6,201 
Production (GWh)  14,678  25,510 
Energy provided (GWh)  8,311  20,701 
Number of clients  2,104,868  3,977,100 
National electrification coefficient 
(%) 56.80%  78.1% 
Distribution loss (%)  21.80%  8.41% 
Investment (US$ millions)  174  393 
           Source: Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM). 
 
The incomplete privatization process has led to the existence of selected private provision 
areas while the rest of the country remains served by state-owned companies, but the National 
Rural Electrification Plan has promoted a broad range of initiatives since 1993 that target the 
poorest areas. 
Unlike other experiences, the incomplete privatization of the electric sector in Peru 
provides a unique scenario by which to evaluate the impact of public versus private provision of 
public services within the same country. This scenario allows us to compare differences in 
access, service quality, and other outcomes of the provision of electricity for the rural poor. In 
particular, taking advantage of available data collected through a specialized electricity and 
energy household rural survey, we will be able to compare differences in welfare between people 
with private provision of electricity and people in regions where electric companies were not 
privatized.  
Moreover, besides analyzing the impact on direct consumer welfare, this study also 
examines other indirect impacts such as the type of energy sources used by consumers in 
privatized versus non-privatized areas, the effects of better quality of electric service on time 
devoted to non-agricultural activities, and the effects on time devoted to economic and non-
economic activities of rural households. 
The paper is divided into the following sections. The second section describes the 
incomplete privatization process and specifically explains how it can be used as an experiment to 
evaluate the impact of public and private provision of electricity on households. Section 3 
describes the specialized survey and electricity database used by the study, and Section 4 6  
describes the econometric techniques used to compare households with private provision versus 
public provision. Section 5 then presents the major findings, and Section 6 outlines some 
preliminary conclusions. 
2. Overview of the Privatization of the Electric Sector in Peru and the 
Dynamics of Public and Private Operators 
2.1. The Privatization Process 
The privatization of the electric sector in Peru took place within a broader privatization process 
that started in 1991 with the Law for the Promotion of Private Investment in State Enterprises 
(DL 674). An ad hoc commission, COPRI, was created to conduct the whole process, and three 
special committees (CEPRIs) were formed to conduct specific processes within the electric 
sector (Electrolima, Electroperu, and Regional Electric Companies).  
In addition, the electric privatization process was conceived as part of a broader reform of 
the electricity sector, introduced with the Law for Electric Concessions (1992). As a result, state-
owned companies were spun off in that same year into several smaller companies, in the 
distribution, transmission, and generation segments, to fulfill the vertical unbundling clauses of 
the law and to provide some basis for yardstick competition. Four companies were created to 
serve the distribution market in Lima, and other regional companies were designed to cover 
broader geographical areas, as shown in Table 2. 
As detailed in Figure 1, the privatization of the electric sector started in 1994 with the 
distribution companies Edelnor and Edelsur (later Luz del Sur), both with concession areas in 
Metropolitan Lima, and then continued with Ede Chancay and Ede Cañete in 1995 and 1996, 
respectively, which served the provinces of Lima and which were acquired by the same 
economic groups controlling Edelnor (Ede Chancay) and Luz del Sur (Ede Cañete). As a result, 
the Lima area is basically 100 percent covered by privatized companies. 
The privatization of the electricity distribution companies in Lima mainly consisted of the 
sale of a 60 percent stake to a private strategic operator, while 10 percent of capital was offered 
to the companies’ workers, and the remaining 30 percent was sold on the stock market (with the 
exception of Ede Cañete, which was totally sold to Luz del Sur). Clearly, the main objective of 
these processes was to maximize the proceeds of the sale for the Peruvian government.
4  
                                                           




Table 2. Public Company Spin-Offs  
 





(only for distribution) 
CEPRI 
 
ELECTROLIMA               
EDELNOR  Distribution   Metropolitan north of Lima, Callao, Huaura, Barranca, 
Huaral and Oyón 
EDELSUR  Distribution   Metropolitan south of Lima 
EDE Chancay  Distribution   Chancay (Huacho, Huaral and Super) 
EDE Cañete  Distribution   Cañete 
EDEGEL  Generation     
CEPRI ELECTROLIMA 
ELECTROPERU               
EGENOR  Generation     
CAHUA  Generation    
ETEVENSA  Generation     
EEPSA  Generation     
CEPRI ELECTROPERU 
REGIONAL COMPANIES   
ELECTRO SUR MEDIO  Distribution  Ica, and part of Huancavelica and Ayacucho 
ELECTRO NORTE 
MEDIO  Distribution  La Libertad, Ancash and part of Cajamarca 
ELECTRO CENTRO  Distribution  Huánuco, Pasco, Junín, and part of Huancavelica and 
Ayacucho 
ELECTRO NORTE  Distribution  Lambayeque, Cajamarca and Amazonas 
ELECTRO NOROESTE  Distribution  Tumbes and Piura 
ELECTRO SUR  Distribution  Tacna and Moquegua 
ELECTRO SUR OESTE  Distribution  Arequipa 
ELECTRO SUR ESTE  Distribution  Puno, Cuzco, Apurimac and Madre de Dios 
EGEMSA  Generation   
EGASA  Generation   







The CEPRI for the regional electricity companies was created in 1996 initially to manage 
the privatization of the eight state-owned regional distribution companies: Electro Sur Medio, 
Electro Norte Medio, Electro Centro, Electro Norte, Electro Noroeste, Electro Sur, Electro Sur 
Oeste, and Electro Sur Este. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
on financial indicators and credentials; sometimes no previous experience was required. Then, competition in the 
second stage was based on the economic offers of qualified bidders. The competitive factor used was the largest 
payment over a price pre-established by COPRI (between US$8.2 and US$129 million, depending of the size and 
importance of the company). 8  
The privatization of Electro Sur Medio took place in 1997, followed in 1998 by the joint 
privatization of Electro Norte, Electro Norte Medio, Electro Noroeste, and Electro Centro. 
Electro Sur Medio was awarded to the HICA consortium of the Argentine IATA and the 
Peruvian C. Tizon, Amauta Industrial, S&Z Consultores Asociados, and Constructores Vásquez 
Espinoza S.A.; while Electro Norte, Electro Norte Medio, Electro Noroeste, and Electro Centro 
were awarded to the Peruvian firm J. Rodríguez Banda S.A- JORBSA (Gloria group). 
The privatization scheme designed for the regional electricity distribution companies 
differed from the processes handled in Lima. With the objective of promoting electrification in 
unserved areas, the model included investment commitments of US$25.64 million to expand the 
electrification frontier in the case of Electro Sur Medio, representing 50 percent of the total 
payment, and no investment commitments but an obligation to serve any potential demand under 
a delimited area of influence in the case of the group of regional companies in the north and 
center.  
 
Table 3. Privatized Companies, Terms of Privatization 
 
Company Date  Price 
(US$m)  Terms (controlling stake) 
Edelnor July  1994  209.3 
Sale of 60% stake to Inversiones Distrilima 
(controlled by Endesa (Spain), Chilectra, and Enersis 
(Chile) and Cosapi (Peru)). Cash. No investment 
commitments. 
Luz del Sur  July 1994  406.9  Sale of 60% to the Ontario Quinta consortium. Cash. 
No investment commitments. 
Ede Chancay  December 
1995  10.5  Sale of 60% to Edelnor. Cash. No investment 
commitments. 
Ede Cañete  June 1996  8.6  Sale of 100% to Luz del Sur. Cash. No investment 
commitments. 
Electro Sur medio  February 
1997  51.28 
Sale of 98.2% to HICA Consortium. 40% cash (20% 
upfront and difference in eight years); 50% through 
investment commitments in rural electrification; 10% 
to be shared with workers. 










Sale of 30% to JORBSA (10% upfront and difference 
in 12 years). An option to acquire an additional 30% 
of the company was included. No investment 
commitments but with the requirement of operating 
rural electrification projects handled by the DEP under 
their area of influence. 
 
    Source: COPRI. 
 9  
In 1999, during the process of privatizing EGASA, the state-owned company controlling 
the southern region of Arequipa’s main hydroelectric plant, popular disturbances impeded the 
adjudication of the company and led to an interruption of the whole privatization process. Electro 
Sur, Electro Suroeste, and Electro Sureste therefore remained in public hands. 
The privatization process suffered an additional downfall when Electro Norte, Electro 
Noroeste, Electro Norte Medio, and Electro Centro were returned to the state by the JORBSA 
group in December 2001. The government then began to design a new privatization process for 
the same companies in 2002, which is why the companies have maintained their private 
structure, operating together under the name “Distriluz,” outside of the common legal framework 
for public companies. For instance, their investments do not enter into the national public 
investment system, nor are they subject to the government procurement laws governing the other 
public companies. (More information is provided in Section 2.3.) 
 






















The privatization process 
in the electric sector 
begins with the 
distribution companies:  
Edelnor (July 1994): 
Inversiones Distrilima 
S.A. (60%) 
Edelsur (July 1994):  Ontario-
Quinta AVV. (60%) 
The company changes its 
name to Luz del Sur S.A. 





Privatization of Ede 
Chancay (December 1995): 
Inversiones Distrilima S.A. 
–Edelnor.  (60%) 
Privatization of Ede 
Cañete (June 1996): 
Luz del Sur S.A 
(100%) 
Privatization of 














COPRI suspends the 
privatization process 
The JORBSA group 
returns ElectroNorte, 
Electro NorOeste,  
Electro Norte Medio 
and Electro Centro 
to the State. The state 
conforms Grupo 
Distriluz 
1991  1992  1993  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 




regional companies: 12 
distribution companies 
in pipeline 
Source: COPRI.    11
2.2 Provision of Electricity in Rural Peru  
The state embarks upon rural electrification projects in order to provide energy to people who are 
not served by the existing electrical system because of the distance and lack of accessibility of 
their dwellings. Most of the time, it is not profitable for the existing companies to supply energy 
to these areas because of the huge investment needed, so public intervention is essential.  
To address the problem of rural electrification, a special division within the Ministry of 
Energy—the Executive Directorate of Projects (DEP)—was created in 1993 to handle energy 
projects and extend the electrical frontier. The DEP received the mandate to create, fund, and 
implement the National Rural Electrification Plan (and to update it annually during a 10-year 
timeframe).  
In 2002, a specific law promoting rural electrification was passed (Law 27744) creating a 
fund for rural electrification under the administration of the DEP and defining criteria for the 
National Rural Electrification Plan. However, the law was inapplicable given its reported 
contradictions with the Decentralization Law (Law 27783) and the Organic Law of Regional 
Governments (Law 27867), and because it was too general in various aspects. Recently, a new 
general law of rural electrification (Law 28749-2006) was enacted to replace the previous one. 
This new law is more extensive, more clearly defines the Rural Electrification System, and 
extends the sources of financing (for example, from 2 to 4 percent of the profits of the electrical 
companies, and consumer contributions of 2/1000 of 1 UIT
5 per MWh consumed). Also, the Law 
involves a systematic effort to organize rural electrification works through the National Rural 
Electrification Plan, considers the role of ADINELSA, and includes an entire section on 
promotion of private investment in rural electrification. 
Peru’s rural sector’s electrification rate was estimated at 32 percent in 2002, up from a 
reported 5 percent in 1992. Rural areas adjacent to urban centers have benefited from the 
expansion of the electrification frontier by distribution concessionaires following the reforms 
introduced in the sector since 1992, but some of the poorest and most remote areas in rural Peru 
have also found access to the service as a result of a broader range of initiatives fueled by other 
sources, mainly the National Rural Electrification Plan. The expansion of the electrification 
frontier by concessionaires and by all these alternatives, however, has not been part of an 
                                                           
5 The Unidad Administrativa Tributaria (UIT) is a tax-related reference unit. As of September 2006, the value of one 
UIT is around US$1,045.   12
organized and systematic plan and, therefore, information on the importance of the various 
modalities of service provision and their results is limited. 
From its creation in 1993 to 2004, the DEP invested US$552 million in rural 
electrification, providing 4.9 million inhabitants with access to electricity. The works are 
financed with its own resources (including income from privatizations) and with external 
contributions. The DEP engages directly in the construction of infrastructure and then transfers 
the operation and maintenance assets to several different actors including distribution companies 
(when the project is under their concession area) or to ADINELSA, a public holding created to 
find an operator for built infrastructure (when the project is outside of concession areas). Since it 
became operational in 1998, ADINELSA has mainly transferred networks and systems to the 
distribution companies that currently operate under Distriluz (Electro Noroeste, Electro Norte, 
Electro Norte Medio, and Electro Centro) because of commitments in the privatization contract 
and has also promoted the creation of municipal or communal-based units to operate other 
infrastructure. These operations are usually not profitable, so ADINELSA provides the necessary 
subsidies to the operator (from a fund based on contributions from concessionaries). 
Public efforts to promote rural electrification have not only consisted of investing in rural 
electrification projects but also of establishing a new tariff structure to make electricity 
affordable for the poor. In August 2001, the Peruvian Congress passed legislation to establish a 
“social tariff” for electricity consumption. The enacted law created the Social Compensation 
Fund (FOSE), a cross-subsidy that benefits final users who consume less than 100 KWh per 
month by providing them with a discount that varies depending on predetermined ranges of 
consumption. This fund is financed by a 3 percent tax on final users who consume more than 100 
KWh per month. The FOSE differentiates tariffs not only with respect to the quantity of Kwh 
consumed but also to the area of consumption, providing more benefits to rural consumers. 
Although the FOSE was originally envisioned to be applied for only three years, Congress 
indefinitely extended the application of the subsidy in July 2004.   
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Table 4. FOSE Subsidy Classifications 
 
Users Sector 
Tariff reduction for 
consumers =< 30 kWh-
month 
Tariff reduction for 
consumers > 30 kWh-
month up to 100 kWh-
month 
Urban   25% energy charge   7,5 kWh-month   Interconnected 
Systems   Urban–rural & rural  50% energy charge  15 kWh- month 
Urban  50% energy charge  15 kWh- month   Isolated 
Systems   Urban–rural & rural  62.5 energy charge  18,75 kWh- month  
      
              Source: Law N° 28307 – 07.28.04 
 
2.3 Public versus Private Provision of Electricity 
Of the 22 distribution companies currently regulated by OSINERG, nine were privatized (of 
which five remain private and four were returned to the state after three years of private 
management); seven have always been public; and six are new private companies created after 
the reform of the sector. Map 1 and Table 5 present the concession areas showing a scenario of 
multiple operating models in the provision of electricity in Peru, which forms the basis of this 
evaluation of the impact of privatization. 
Currently, electricity in Peru is provided through two main actors: (i) the traditional spun-
off state-owned distribution companies; and (ii) privatized distribution companies. In addition, a 
few new private distribution companies have been established, under operating models which 
include schemes of subsidized electricity infrastructure investment, defined and carried out 
through governmental and non-for-profit institutions, which are later transferred for their 
operation to existing distribution companies or newly created units at local governments. 
Municipal or community-based operating units have also appeared as the result of the 
Decentralization Laws.   14
 
Table 5. Distribution Companies 
 
Company  Property Number of 
customers  Concession Areas 
Consorcio eléctrico de Villacuri S.A. (Coelvisa) Private   644  Lima, Ica and Huánuco 
Electro Paramonga  Private  5,687  Paramonga 
Electro Utcubamba (Emseusa)  Private  4,902  Utcubamba 
Electro Pangoa  Private  1,033  Pangoa  
Electro Rioja  Private  4,087  San Martin 
Electro Tocache  Private  7,114  Tocache 
Ede Cañete   Privatized  25,978  Cañete 
Edelnor  
Privatized 
Metropolitan north of Lima, Callao and 
the provinces: Huaura, Barranca, 
Huaral and Oyón 
Edechancay  Privatized 
912,186 
Chancay (Huacho, Huaral and Supe) 
Electro Sur Medio 
Privatized  123,311 
Ica, and part of Huancavelica and 
Ayacucho 
Luz del Sur S.A.  Privatized  719,651  Metropolitan south of Lima 
Chavimochic  Public  3,316  La Libertad 
Electro Oriente   Public  126,581  Loreto, San Martin 
Electro Puno   Public  115,656  Puno 
Electrosur   Public  95,896  Tacna and Moquegua 
Electro Sur Este  
Public  228,696 
Puno, Cuzco, Apurimac and Madre de 
Dios 
Electro Ucayali  Public  41,811  Ucayali 
Electrocentro  Mixed**  364,957  Huánuco, Pasco, Junín, and part of 
Huancavelica and Ayacucho 
Electro Norte Medio-Hidrandina 
Mixed**  396,563 
La Libertad, Ancash and part of 
Cajamarca 
Electro noroeste   Mixed**  228,753  Tumbes and Piura 
Electronorte 
Mixed**  218,346 
Lambayeque, Cajamarca and 
Amazonas 
Sociedad Eléctrica del Sur Oeste  Mixed**  234,477  Arequipa 
Total     3,859,645    
           
**Privatized and returned to the State          
 
Source: OSINERG and MEM. 
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Map 1. 


























































The penetration of both state-owned and privatized distribution companies has been 
significantly shaped by the structure of the electricity sector as conceived by the Law for Electric 
Concessions, which grants zonal concessions to the main distribution companies. In essence, 
there is one operator per concession area to achieve economies of scale, and a requirement to 
provide service to whomever requires it within the concession area and to facilitate installations   16
for other operators that require it (within a one-year period). Expansions in these areas have been 
achieved mainly through connecting new users to the national grid. 
Other actors, however, such as newly created private companies and municipal entities, 
operate under different incentives schemes. Private companies have mainly been created to 
supply the electricity demand of selected agricultural and other business-related areas, while 
municipal and community-based initiatives have been developed as a result of national or 
municipal endeavors of various types—mainly to serve the most remote areas. Since the 
enactment of the 1992 Law, only six new private companies have been created and are almost 
exclusively oriented to the business sector (not residential). In contrast, there is evidence of a 
significant number of small municipal and community-base initiatives. Most of these access 
gains have been achieved through the construction of small and isolated power systems. 
Classifying State-Owned Distribution Companies and Privatized Companies 
This paper classifies as public distribution companies those that have always been in public 
hands. As shown in blue in Map 1, they are the following: Electro Sur, Electro Sur Este, Electro 
Puno, Electro Ucayali, and Electro Oriente. Through concessions, these companies cover more 
450,000 square kilometers in Peru’s coastal, Andean, and jungle regions and, as of December 
2004, served 843,000 clients (representing 22 percent of the total). These companies have 
expanded to rural areas within their concession areas. In addition, the DEP has transferred 
several projects to them within the framework of the National Rural Electrification Plan. 
Private companies, on the other hand, need to be classified into two groups:  
i)  Electro Norte, Electro Norte Medio, Electro Nor Oeste, and Electro Centro 
(together Distriluz), which were privatized and remained in private hands for 
three years before being returned to the state in 2001. The Distriluz companies 
have concession areas in Peru’s northern coast and the central Andean region, 
covering 180,200 km and serving 1.2 million clients by the end of 2004 (31 
percent of total clients in the country);  
ii)  Companies that were privatized and are still private, i.e., Edelnor, Luz del Sur, 
Ede Cañete, and Electro Sur Medio. These companies cover 40,584 square 
kilometers in concession areas and serve 46 percent of total clients.   17
The “Distriluz” companies constitute a peculiar case that deserves further analysis to 
determine its classification as private or public. As mentioned before, these public companies 
were privatized in 1998 as part of the privatization process. While these companies were in 
private hands—the Rodríguez Banda Group (JORSA–Gloria Group)
6—important changes took 
place, resulting in a significant reduction of electricity losses in distribution,
7 for example, and a 
reversal of negative financial balances. A few years later in 2000, however, the Gloria Group 
argued that it could not afford to fulfill its investment commitments. After negotiations, an 
arrangement was made and the Gloria Group returned control of the four companies to the state. 
They were registered as the “Distriluz” group in 2001 (having a single directory and sharing 
policies as they did when in private hands). It is formally a mixed company, but private firms 
have only very minor participation.
8 Nonetheless, Distriluz is treated by the regulatory agency 
OSINERG and the tax agency as a private firm and is not required to comply with other public 
firms’ regulations (Law 674), such as registration and approval of investments by the National 
Public Investment System (SNIP) or observance of the State Contracting and Procurement Law 
or the Public Indebtedness System. Furthermore, as Distriluz directors and personnel are hired 
through private contracts, its labor regime is based on Law 728, which regulates the activity of 
private firms, and the companies manage their own budgets.  
This arrangement was possible because of a special exclusion norm (COPRI 363) that 
allowed the Distriluz group to keep a private regime because it was supposed to return to private 
hands within a short period. However, the exclusion norm has been renewed every year since the 
return of Distriluz to public ownership. This situation is very peculiar, as it is the only case of a 
public company that functions under private market rules.    
Under their privatization contract, the Distriluz companies (unlike other private 
distribution firms) were required to provide electricity service not only in their concession areas 
but also, if required, in a larger area of influence (mostly rural), which was defined in the 
contract. As a result, these companies operate in various rural areas (Table 6). In addition, and as 
shown in Table 7, the companies have also received several electricity distribution networks 
                                                           
6 And other minor private partners, most of whom are still shareholders. 
7 Distribution energy losses were 18.68 percent in 1998 and were reduced to 9.88 percent by the end of 2001.  
8 Electronoroeste and Electrocentro are 100 percent public, while Electronorte is 99.99 percent public; in the case of 
Hidrandina, 5.3 percent of total shares are in private hands.    18
built-up by the DEP under the auspices of the National Rural Electrification Plan, for operation 
and maintenance purposes.  
 
 
Table 6. Number of Customers in Rural Areas (2005) 
 
   Interconnected Isolated TOTAL 
EMPRESAS systems  systems   
         
Edecañete 5,735  71  5,806 
Electro-Oriente 0  2,824  2,824 
Electro-Puno 4,589  1  4,590 
Electro-Sur-Este 128,668 0  128,668 
Electro-Sur-Medio 9,610  1,152  10,762 
Electro Ucayali  654  0  654 
Electro-Centro 170,118  5,642  175,760 
Electro-Nor-Este 28,039 301  28,340 
Electro-Norte 12,779  25,653  38,432 
Electro-Sur 9,678  0  9,678 
Emseusa   4006  4,006 
Hidrandina 41,240  9,023  50,263 
Seal 15,775  5,011  20,786 
Otros 41,300  25,416  66,717 
TOTAL    468,185  79,100  547,286 
 
          Source: OSINERG.       
 
In the Lima area, Edelnor and Luz del Sur have reached an almost 100 percent coverage 
of their concession areas, involving some rural areas. In addition, both companies have expanded 
their influence to nearby rural areas in some provinces of Lima (Table 6). No transfers from 
DEP/ADINELSA have been reported. 
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Table 7. 
DEP and Adinelsa Rural Projects’ Transfers  
to Distribution Companies 
 
Company 
Number of rural 
projects transferred 
by 
   DEP  ADINELSA 
Electro Sur 
Medio 16  n.a. 
Coelvisa n.a.  2 
Electro Tocache  n.a.  2 
Electro Norte 
Medio 39  n.a. 
Electro Norte  32  38 
Electro Centro  42  28 
Electro Noroeste 24  8 
Electro Sur  14  n.a. 
Electro Suroeste  44  n.a. 
Electro Sureste  74  n.a. 
Electro Oriente  46  10 
Electro Ucayali  16  n.a. 
Electro Puno  20  n.a. 
Municipalities 32  38 
 
Source: DEP and ADINELSA. 
 
In the immediate southern environs of Lima, Electro Sur Medio has contributed to the 
electrification of rural areas such as Huancavelica and Ica as part of its investment commitment 
(US$25.64 million). In addition, the DEP has transferred a few rural projects to the company for 
operation and management.  
Finally, municipal and community-based electricity operations have been reported to 
exist in various areas across the country. Some of these operations have their origins in the 
National Rural Electrification Plan carried out by the DEP, while others originate from other 
initiatives such as the external cooperation mandates of international financial institutions. Given 
that in most of these cases, the scope of the distribution service is under the 500Kw limit 
required to be a concession, it is difficult to identify them extensively. Furthermore, based on the 
survey under study,
9 their coverage is still limited (covering only around 3 percent of clients). 
                                                           
9 National Survey of Rural Energy Demand.   20
In summary, this scenario of multiple operating models providing electricity in rural Peru 
provides a unique opportunity to evaluate differences in households’ welfare resulting from 
private versus public provision of the service. 
3. Data 
One of the major characteristics of the privatization processes is a lack of detailed pre- and post-
privatization information on the privatized firms. Our advantage is that we have access to a 
representative survey of electricity and energy use in rural Peru. Specifically, the sample 
universe for the survey includes all communities in Peru with a thousand or less households, 
whether rural-dispersed, semi-rural or peri-urban. This survey was implemented during June and 
July of 2005 in the 24 departments of Peru. The survey includes two components: Population 
centers (communities) in each dominion of the study (446), and 6,690 the households . 
The survey is representative of seven subregional divisions: Costa Norte (Northern 
Coast); Costa Centro (Central Coast); Costa Sur (Southern Coast); Sierra Norte (Northern 
Andean Region); Sierra Centro (Central Andean Region); Sierra Sur (Southern Andean Region) 
and Selva (Amazon region). The sampling size is distributed according to Table 8. 
 
Table 8. Distribution of the Sample Size 
 







Total 446  6,690   
COSTA NORTE  64  960  0.032 
COSTA CENTRO   64  960  0.050 
COSTA SUR  48  720  0.038 
SIERRA NORTE  66  990  0.021 
SIERRA CENTRO  68  1,020  0.029 
SIERRA SUR  68  1,020  0.024 
SELVA 68  1,020  0.022 
      
 
The advantage of the survey is that it not only contains the traditional questions found on 
an LSMS survey (which provide us with sufficient variables to use in the matching procedure), 
but that it also contains specific modules on electricity and energy consumption, which allows us 
to answer the main questions of this study. Specifically, the survey includes information on the   21
households’ sources of energy, and it collects detailed information on the provision of electricity 
for the households connected to the grid. For these households, the survey collects information 
on the name of the distribution company (crucial in identifying areas where privatized companies 
are operating) and the year in which the household was connected to the grid, details on 
consumption and the last three electric bills, number of hours in a day households had access to 
service, and quality of service provision.  
Based on the information obtained from the survey, and following the previous 
classification of private and public distribution companies, we observe that 24 percent of the 
households are served by private distribution companies; 15 percent are served by public 
companies; 3 percent are served by other models including regional, municipal, and communal 
operations; and the rest do not have access to electricity. It is also important to note that an 
important percentage of the households served by private distribution companies—16 percent—
is served by the Distriluz group’s regional distribution companies, which, as noted above, are no 
longer private but still retain some private elements.  
Based on survey information, Map 2 shows the geographic location of the private and 
public operators and the number of observations. It is clear that private operators are mainly 
located in the coastal and central Andean regions. 
Table 9 shows the means of the main variables included in the database. As can be seen, 
most households without access to electricity are worse off than households with access to 
electricity, either through private or public sources. Households without access to electricity are 
less educated, have more members, have less access to other infrastructures, work mainly in farm 
activities, and have significantly lower per capita income and expenditure.    22
 
Table 9. 
Distribution of Sample by Electricity Company 
COMPANY OBS
PRIVATE COMPANIES
ELECTRONORTE MEDIO (HIDRANDINA) 341 Ancash, Cajamarca, La Liberta
ELECTRO NOROESTE 266 Piura, tumbes
ELECTRO SUR MEDIO 264 Ayacucho, Huancavelica, Ica
ELECTROCENTRO 243 Pasco, Junin, Huanuco, Huancavelica, Ayacucho
ELECTRONORTE 204 Lambayeque, Cajamarca, Amazonas
EDELNOR 115 Lima
EDE CAÑETE 96 Lima
LUZ DEL SUR 65 Lima
SOCIEDAD MINERA COLQUIRRUMI 15 Cajamarca
CMTE ELECTRIFICACION CHUGUR 5 Cajamarca
TOTAL PRIVATE 1/ 1614
TOTAL PRIVATE 2/ 500
PUBLIC COMPANIES
SEAL 400 Arequipa
ELECTRO SUR ESTE 249 Madre de Dios, Cusco, Apurimac
ELECTRO PUNO 171 Puno
ELECTROSUR 117 Moquegua, Tacna
MUNICIPALITIES, LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, 
AND OTHERS 90 Various
ELECTRO ORIENTE 86 Loreto
ADINELSA 58 Lima, Ica
AUTODEMA 15 Arequipa
ELECTRO SAN GABAN 15 Puno
ELECTRO SHITARIYACU 14 San Martin
ELECTRO UCAYALI 11 Ucayali
TOTAL PUBLIC 1/ 1226 1226 2340




Source: National Survey of Rural Energy Demand.       
The top for companies are the ones that correspond to the DISTRILUZ group.  
1/ Considering DISTRILUZ as private. 
2/ Considering DISTRILUZ as public. 
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    Source: National Survey of Rural Energy Demand. 
 
Private by district (# obs) 
Public by district (# obs)                                   24
As seen in Table 10, a comparison of households with private access versus public access 
to electricity also shows significant differences, although in this case the differences are smaller 
and the direction is not clear (they are not consistently better off in one case or the other). For 
example, households with private access have a statistically significant higher number of 
members, the household head is older, there are more female household heads, they are less 
likely to be indigenous, they work fewer hours, and they concentrate more on non-farm 
activities. Therefore, it is necessary to make these two groups more comparable in order to 
analyze the potential impacts of private versus public provision of electricity. The following 
section details the methodology developed to make the groups comparable. Then, Section 5 
presents the main differences with regard to some key dependent variables, such as performance 
of provision of electricity at the household level and the indirect impacts of better or worse 
performance on total hours of work and on allocation of working hours between farm and non-
farm activities.     25
 
Table 10. 
Summary Statistics of Main Variables under Study at the Household Level 
 
Without
electricity (1) Public (2) Private (3) (1) & (2) (1) & (3) (2) & (3)
Household characteristics
Age of household head 48.08 48.91 50.91 *** ***
Years of education of HH head 5.00 7.07 6.97 *** ***
Female head of household 0.13 0.14 0.18 *** ***
Indigenous HH head 0.32 0.45 0.19 *** *** ***
Household size (members) 4.49 4.19 4.36 *** * **
Proportion 0-5 y.o. 0.12 0.09 0.08 *** ***
Proportion 6-13 y.o. 0.19 0.18 0.18 * **
Proportion 14-60 y.o. 0.54 0.59 0.58 *** ***
Proportion 60 yrs or older 0.15 0.14 0.16 *
Household with pipeline water a/. 0.17 0.54 0.59 *** *** ***
Other sources of water access a/. 0.23 0.16 0.13 *** *** **
Water from river, lake, etc. a/. 0.27 0.19 0.20 *** ***
Town characteristics
Population (in thousands) 350.69 1228.41 1336.68 *** *** **
Public phone in town a/. 0.09 0.54 0.46 *** *** ***
Secondary school in town a/. 0.13 0.56 0.52 *** *** **
Paved road in town a/. 0.26 0.63 0.61 *** ***
Town in coast a/. 0.35 0.39 0.59 ** *** ***
Town in highlands a/. 0.46 0.47 0.36 *** ***
Town in jungle a/. 0.18 0.14 0.05 *** *** ***
Time allocation and welfare
Hours of work - HH 12.18 12.54 10.90 * *** ***
Hours of work - HH (incl chores) 19.17 19.16 17.27 *** ***
Prop of non-ag hours of work - HH 0.23 0.39 0.49 *** *** ***
Prop of non-ag hours of work - HH (incl chores) 0.14 0.25 0.29 *** *** ***
Hours of leisure (TV and radio) 3.24 4.17 4.42 *** *** **
Hours of leisure (TV, radio, socializing, and others) 6.98 7.71 9.16 *** *** ***
Proportion of non-ag income 0.31 0.33 0.40 *** ***
Per capita expenditure 136.47 198.24 217.25 *** *** ***
Energy
Number of sources of electricity 4.00 3.09 2.83 ** *** ***
Exp in electricity (% of exp in energy) N/A 0.47 0.48 N/A N/A
Exp in electricity (% of total exp) N/A 0.05 0.05 N/A N/A
Price per Kw N/A 1.08 1.00 N/A N/A
Number of monthly failures (30+ min) N/A 1.32 1.30 N/A N/A
Often dimming in elect service a/. N/A 0.13 0.11 N/A N/A **
Monthly hours of blackouts c/. N/A 5.62 4.59 N/A N/A **
With electricity Diff is significant?
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4. Statistical and Econometric Methodology 
This section compares differences in the set of dependent variables between households in 
privatized areas and a comparison group consisting of a sample of similar households in 
communities (centros poblados) where privatization has not yet taken place, as shown in Map 2. 
To construct the required comparison group, a two-step matching process was followed and is 
detailed in Figure 2.  
The process first consists of a non-parametric town matching and a household matching 
based on propensities scores with the distribution of bootstrapped means of matched treatments 
and controls. With respect to town matching, we estimate the control town and treatment town 
pairs non-parametrically using cell means based on access to public telephone, type of road, 
secondary school in town, quintiles of population, and region (coast, sierra, or jungle). The 
resulting matching yielded a distribution of treated and control towns that were approximately 
symmetrically distributed.  
Second, household matching is based on propensity scores of households within each 
control and treatment town group. The framework serving as a guideline for the empirical 
analysis is the Roy-Rubin model (Roy, 1951; Rubin, 1974). Inference on the impact of a 
treatment (privatization in our specific case) on the outcome of an individual involves 
speculation about how this individual would have responded had he or she not received the 
treatment. Therefore, the objective will be to capture what happened to a household in a 
privatized area versus what happened to a household in a non-privatized area.  
We define a binary assignment indicator, D, indicating whether a household unit actually 
was affected by the program (D=1, meaning the household is located in a community where 
electricity is provided by a private firm) or not (D=0) (Hujer and Wellner, 2000; Lechner, 2000). 




C             ( 1 )  
where Y will be the income (welfare effect) of the household and the supra indices refer to the 
treatment group (T) and the control group (C) where the treatment is an area where the electric 
company (distribution) was privatized.    27
The fundamental problem of evaluating this household treatment effect arises because the 





C        ( 2 )  
Unfortunately we can never observe Y
T and Y
C for the same household unit 
simultaneously. The unobservable component in (2) is called the counterfactual outcome, so that 
for households that participated in the measure (D=1), Y
C is the counterfactual outcome, and for 
those that did not, it is Y
T. Therefore, there will never be an opportunity to estimate households’ 
gains with confidence. As a result, we have to concentrate on the population average of gains 
from treatment: the average treatment effect on the treated: 
E[Δ\D=1]= E(Y
T \ D=1) - E(Y
C \ D=1)    (3) 
As Hujer and Wellner (2000) note, this parameter provides an answer to the following 
question: “What is the expected or mean outcome gain for individuals who received treatment as 
opposed to a hypothetical situation where they do not receive it?” This question focuses directly 
on actual participating units, so that it determines the realized gross gain from the program and 
can be compared with its costs. This will help decide whether the program is a success or not 
(Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 1997 and 1998; Heckman, LaLonde and Smith, 1999). 
The second term on the right side of Equation (3) is unobservable since it describes the 
hypothetical outcome without treatment for those units that received treatment. If the condition: 
E(Y
C \ D=1)=E(Y
C\D=0)     (4) 
holds, we can use non-participants as an adequate control group. This identifying assumption is 
likely to hold only in social experiments, where the key concept is randomized assignment of 
households units into treatment and control groups. In non-experimental data, as in this study, 
Equation (4) will normally not hold. The use of non-participants as a control group will therefore 
lead to a selection bias. Heckman and Hotz (1989) point out that selection might occur on 
observables and unobservables. 
 






























1. TOWN MATCHNG: 
Among towns with public and private electricity providers, find comparable towns regarding 
the following criteria:  (1) Access to public phone; (2) type of road; (3) secondary school in 
town; (4) quintile of population; (5) region – coast, sierra or jungle.  
 




Within comparable towns, 
households with private 
electricity providers are 
matched to those with public 
providers. Propensity score 
matching (kernel) is performed 
using the following variables: 
HH size, demographic 
composition, ethnicity of HH 
head (self-reported), age of HH 
head, education of HH head, sex 
of HH head, and access to water 
public network. 
Town A (private 
provider) 
















Town B (public 
provider)  Propensity score matching 
of households among 
comparable towns 
Town F (public 
provider) 
Distribution of variable Y, by electricity provider 
Distribution of variable Y, two-step matching 
Distribution of bootstrapped means of matched 
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We will try an estimation approach that estimates the unobserved counterfactual term 
using the observed outcome information obtained from the non-participants and taking into 
account selection on observables as well as selection on unobservables (see Hujer and Caliendo, 
2000, for a detailed description).  
To develop the control group, we use the propensity score matching approach. The basic 
idea underlying the matching approach is to search within a large group of non-participants in 
the matched towns to find those individual units that remain similar to the participants in all 
relevant pre-treatment characteristics. A variable summarizing all these relevant characteristics is 
estimated as the probability of receiving based on a probit model.
10 Households in the treatment 
group are matched to relevant controls as a function of differences in their propensity scores. 
From among the different approaches as to how to match households in both groups (i.e., one-to-
one, radial, “k” nearest neighbors, local linear regression, etc.), we opted for kernel matching 
with a quadratic function (Epanechnikov). Under the latter methodology, each household of the 
treatment group is matched to a weighted average of all available controls. For each treatment, a 
set of weights is estimated for every control as a function of the difference between its propensity 
score and that of the control. Once a suitable counterfactual for every treatment observation has 
been found, the differences in the outcomes between well-selected and adequate control group 
and the participants can then be attributed to the program.   
Finally, we use bootstrapping to recover the empirical distribution of the treatments and 
the controls. The significance level of the differences is then computed after 10,000 iterations 
following Davidson and MacKinnon (1999). 
5. Empirical Results 
Theoretically, propensity score matching should be able to balance characteristics not related to 
treatment, but it is prone to affecting the outcome variables between treatment and control 
groups. Thus, if all the relevant characteristics remain the same, with the only difference being in 
the treatment, it can be inferred that discrepancies in the outcome variables between both groups 
can be attributed to the program under assessment.  
Our results suggest that our proposed two-step propensity score matching procedure 
performs better, finding more rigorous counterfactuals for households with private provision of 
                                                           
10 Several procedures for matching the propensity score can be used. A good review can be found in Heckman et al. 
(1998).   30
electricity. To test this improvement, we analyzed how well different matching methods balance 
the differences in a set of observable characteristics between households with public and private 
provision of electricity. To simplify, we performed a one-to-one matching procedure of 
households in the treatment and control groups with three alternative procedures: (i) traditional 
propensity score matching considering household characteristics, (ii) traditional propensity score 
matching considering household and town characteristics in a single probit equation, and (iii) our 
proposed two-step estimator. This allowed us to observe not only the differences in the outcome 
variables (as in the case of the kernel matching), but also the differences in other observable 
characteristics of each treatment and its selected control household. Our results are presented in 
Appendix C. Our method provides better balancing between both groups and, overall, achieves 
satisfactory comparability.  
The transfer from the public to the private sector (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988) necessarily 
implies a change in the relationships between those responsible for the firm’s decisions and the 
beneficiaries of the profit flows (the social view and the agency view). In theory, the transfer of 
property rights leads to a different structure of management incentives, causing changes in 
managerial behavior, company performance, and quality of service in terms of access and use. In 
this paper we concentrate on changes in the quality of service and on their respective impacts on 
a household’s welfare. Specifically, the main objective of this paper is to assess the two main 
effects of the provision of electricity through a private provider: first, the effects on electric 
service quality, and second, whether this improvement in quality results in an improvement in a 
household’s welfare through its effects on either changes in total hours of work or on time 
allocation between farm and non-farm activities. 
5.1 Changes in the Quality of Electricity Service 
It is expected that a change in private provision, with different management structure incentives, 
should significantly improve the quality of the service. Specifically, the traditional literature 
normally mentions that privatization will have a significant impact on investment, access, quality 
of service, and a realignment of tariffs. In the Peruvian case, as we have previously shown, there 
was a significant improvement in investment as a result of the privatization. Similarly, the 
coefficient of electrification increased significantly during the past decade. For example, 
currently 100 percent of Edelnor customers (83 percent of whom belong to the poorer segments 
of Lima’s inhabitants) have electricity. Edelnor’s investments have added to the network 225,000   31
customers in approximately 500 communities. Similarly, a significant realignment of tariffs was 
expected, so that they would reflect real costs, resulting in losses in the consumer surplus of 
households. However, as mentioned before, in 2001, a “social tariff” for electricity consumption 
was established (FOSE—“Fondo de Compensación Social Eléctrica”).   
Finally, with respect to the quality of service, it is expected that consumers will face 
fewer service failures (less dimming in electric services, fewer hours of blackouts, and a lower 
number of failures), have more hours of electricity, use fewer sources of energy, and increase 
their consumption of electricity.  
Table 11 presents the results of the electricity performance indicators at the household 
level after the two-step matching procedure. As expected, households that use distribution from 
privatized providers have better quality of electricity provision. Specifically, households report 
less dimming, a smaller number of monthly failures, and lower monthly hours of blackouts. This 
implies that they have a better quality of provision and a subsequent reduction in costs. 
Similarly, households with private provision have significantly higher expenditures on 
electricity, both as share of their total expenditure and also as share of their expenditure on 
energy sources. This result, together with the fact that prices are lower, implies that there is a 
clear increase in the amount of electricity consumption by these households. 
Additionally, and as expected, there is a significant reduction in the number of sources of 
energy used by households linked to private providers. As mentioned in Appendix B, households 
can access energy from 14 possible sources,
11 but given improvements in the quality and hours of 
electricity provision, it seems they reduce their overall sources of energy from 3.169 to 2.84. 
 
                                                           
11 The options are (1) electricity, (2) kerosene, (3) candles, (4) dry cell batteries, (5) car batteries, (6) liquefied 
petroleum gas, (7) solar home system, (8) firewood, (9) animal dung, (10) crop residues, (11) electric generator set, 
(12) charcoal, (13) coal, and (14) others.  
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Table 11. Matching Results on Performance Indicators 
 
Treat Control 
Exp in electricity (% of exp in energy) 0.48 0.46 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.05
Exp in electricity (% of total exp) 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01
Number of sources of electricity 2.83 3.19 -0.36 0.07 -0.49 -0.22 **
Price per Kw 1.04 1.14 -0.10 0.07 -0.36 -0.05 **
Number of monthly failures (30+ min)  1.41 1.53 -0.12 0.16 -0.38 0.25
Often dimming in elect dervice 0.12 0.16 -0.04 0.01 -0.10 -0.01 **
Monthly hours of blackouts 
a/. 4.72 5.66 -0.94 0.64 -2.24 0.24
Mean
[ 95% Conf Interval ] ATT S.E.
 
a/. The two-stage PS matching difference was significant at 10 percent. 
** denotes significance at a 95 percent level of confidence 
Note: Standard errors are based on 10,000 iterations of the two-step matching procedure. See Appendix B for a 
description of the variables. 
 
 
The next question to ask is whether these improvements in the provision of electric 
service have an impact on a household’s welfare, or what we have called  potential indirect 
impacts. 
5.2 Impacts of Better Quality of Electric Service on Hours of Work and on Time Allocation for 
Farm and Non-Farm activities 
The aggregate level links between poverty and rural infrastructure have been studied by several 
authors, but among the most important of these works are Lipton and Ravallion (1995), Jiménez 
(1995), and Van de Walle (1996), in addition to those cited above.
12   
In order to further analyze the effects of public infrastructure, and specifically the effects 
of the improvement of the quality of electricity due to the presence of a private distributor, it is 
necessary to distinguish between direct and indirect effects. The former occur when an increase 
in access to electricity is accompanied by an increase in production, shifting the production 
frontier and marginal cost curve, and also increasing the rate of return for private investment in 
rural activities. The latter take place when access to more or higher quality electricity permits a 
                                                           
12 For a specific infrastructure impact case (like the role of rural roads, telephones, or access to electricity on poverty 
alleviation) the literature is very broad and includes works such as Howe and Richards (1984), Binswanger, 
Khandker, and Rosenzweig (1993), Jacoby (1998), and Lebo and Schelling (2001), among others. Recently, 
Renkow, Hallstrom, and Karanja. (2003) estimate the fixed transaction costs (those not dependent on 
commercialized volume) that impede access to product markets by subsistence farmers in Kenya. These authors 
estimate that high transaction costs are equivalent to a value-added tax of approximately 15 percent, illustrating the 
opportunities to raise producer welfare with effective infrastructure investments. Smith et al. (2001) show that the 
rehabilitation of roads in Uganda increases labor opportunities in the service sector.  
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reduction in the transaction costs that small producers face when they integrate into the supply 
and factor markets. These lower transaction costs change the structure of relative prices 
significantly for the producer, stimulating changes as transitions occur in the allocation of the 
labor force between agricultural and non-agricultural uses. The latter effects are what we are 
trying to measure in this subsection. 
There are three possible channels through which these indirect impacts on income may be 
affected by access to infrastructure and, in our specific case, to better quality of electricity 
provision. On the one hand, there is the impact of changes on the proportion of working hours 
allocated to different activities. Specifically, we analyze shifts in labor devoted to agricultural 
and non-agricultural activities. Our hypothesis is that access to better quality of electricity leads 
to greater opportunities for non-farm work activities. On the other hand, the second channel 
captures the effect of changes in the household’s total working hours as a result of longer hours 
of access to electricity. Finally, there is scope for increases in rural households’ market 
efficiency through increases in their purchasing power. Along these lines, the third channel 
captures changes based on returns to labor (that is, hourly wages) allocated to agricultural and 
non-agricultural activities. Specifically in the case of agricultural activities, this will be directly 
related to prices of their products. In this study we will concentrate on the first two effects given 
that their relationship to better quality and hours of electricity is clearer. 
Table 12 provides results for labor mobility and the allocation of labor between farm and 
non-farm activities. Better quality of electricity has a significant and positive effect on labor 
mobility to non-farm activities. Specifically, there is an increase in non-farm activities in the 
three indicators presented. Households with private provision of electricity allocate around 10 
percent more of their working time to non-farm activities. Specifically, without including chores, 
they expend 50 percent of their time on average on non-farm activities while households with 
public access expend an average of 40 percent of their time on non-farm activities. This 
proportion increases to 52 percent when we conduct an analysis at the individual level rather 
than at the household level. The rural non-farm sector has developed as a major source of 
employment, and it seems that there is a positive association between this kind of development 
and a better quality and duration of the provision of electricity. The non-farm activities that have 
developed so far, however, appear to be mainly in the tertiary sector, probably as a result of rural   34





Indirect Impacts of Better Access and Better Quality of Electricity 
 
Treat Control 
Hours of work - HH 10.66 12.34 -1.68 0.35 -2.45 -1.09 **
Hours of work - HH (incl chores) 17.00 19.18 -2.18 0.31 -2.94 -1.75 **
Prop of non-ag hours of work - HH 0.50 0.40 0.10 0.03 0.05 0.16 **
Prop of non-ag hours of work - HH (incl chores) 0.29 0.25 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.08 **
Hours of work - indiv (incl chores) 5.34 6.19 -0.86 0.18 -1.25 -0.53 **
Hours of work - indiv 8.50 9.68 -1.18 0.13 -1.55 -1.03 **
Prop of non-ag hours of work - indiv 0.52 0.43 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.13 **
Prop of non-ag hours of work - indiv (incl chores) 0.28 0.25 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.06
Mean
ATT S.E. [ 95% Conf Interval ]
 
** Denotes significance at a 95 percent level of confidence 
Note: Standard errors are based on 10,000 iterations of the three-step matching procedure. See Appendix B for a 
description of the variables. 
 
With respect to the total working hours, propensity score matching was used to formally 
assess the impact of private provision of electricity on total household hours worked per average 
day, as was the case with the share of farm and non-farm activities. The results show that 
households with access to electricity from private providers work an average of 1.7 hours less 
and per capita around 1.18 hours less. A possible explanation is that men and women allocate 
their time to a variety of economic and non-economic activities with important implications for 
their income, health, leisure, and overall livelihood and well-being. As a result, better access to 
electricity and non-farm activities could allow them to increase their efficiency, reduce their total 
work burden, increase their leisure time, or earn more income using the same number of working 
hours. 
When we examine in detail the time allocation of the household head and spouse between 
treatment and control households (see Table 13), differences in time allocation are concentrated 
in three main activities. First, as previously mentioned, there is a significant increase in time 
allocated to non-farm activities or more time allocated by the control on farm activities (4.34 
percent); secondly, the treatment group spends more time on handcrafts and shop tending (1.62 
percent) and other leisure activities (2.87 percent). This result is consistent with communities   35
with more hours of electricity and with better quality of service, which allows them to assign part 
of their time to non-farm-related activities and to have better choices in leisure activities.  
 
Table 13. 
Differences in Time Allocation between Treatment and Control Households 
a/. 
(Head of household + spouse 
b/.) 
 
Control Treatment Control Treatment Difference
Sleeping 16.13 16.25 33.61% 33.85% 0.24%
Bathing / grooming 0.90 1.13 *** 1.87% 2.36% 0.49%
Cooking 2.96 3.11 6.16% 6.48% 0.32%
Farming, gardening, animal husbandry, fishing 7.12 5.04 *** 14.83% 10.50% -4.34%
Income earning act. such as handicrafts, tending shop, etc 4.43 5.21 ** 9.22% 10.85% 1.62%
Eating 2.84 2.95 5.91% 6.15% 0.24%
Processing food 0.27 0.22 0.57% 0.45% -0.12%
Water fetching and fuel collection 0.56 0.52 1.17% 1.09% -0.08%
Laundry, house cleaning 2.31 2.19 4.82% 4.57% -0.25%
Repairing clothes, basket equipment, tools, etc 0.65 0.45 *** 1.36% 0.94% -0.42%
Religious practices (praying, reading bible, etc) 0.37 0.34 0.77% 0.71% -0.06%
Reading, studying 0.43 0.53 0.90% 1.10% 0.20%
Watching TV, listening to radio, resting 4.74 4.58 9.88% 9.54% -0.34%
Visiting neighbors, socializing 1.57 1.85 * 3.28% 3.85% 0.57%
Other leisure activities 1.52 2.90 *** 3.16% 6.03% 2.87%
Shopping 1.19 0.70 *** 2.48% 1.46% -1.02%
Other 0.00 0.04 0.00% 0.09% 0.09%





a/. Nearest neighbor (caliper=0.01) two-step propensity score matching. 
b/. Sample has been limited to households with available information for both head of household and spouse. 
 
Finally, Table 14 presents some global measures of welfare. Consistent with the previous 
results, per capita expenditure is not statistically different between both types of households. 
This could be because major income changes occur as a result of having or not having access, 
and in our specific analysis both groups of households already have access to electricity. 
Moreover, households with better provision of electricity work fewer total hours because they 
can compensate their income with activities in the non-farm sector, which pay higher salaries. 
Therefore, our results seem to indicate that the quality of electricity matters in increasing the 
availability of non-farm activities and therefore the distribution of working hours between farm, 
non-farm, and leisure activities. This result is clear when we analyze the proportion of non-farm 
income. Non-farm income accounts for 41 percent of the total income of households with private 
provision of electricity and 32 percent of the income of households with public provision. In   36
addition, households with private provision spent around 1.5 hours more on leisure activities. In 
summary, better quality of electricity implies a more efficient allocation of rural households’ 
time, which allows them to have more time for recreation. 
 
Table 14. 
Indirect Impacts of Better Access and Better Quality of Electricity on Total Welfare 
 
Treat Control 
Per capita expenditure  219.25 228.10 -8.85 8.75 -31.11 3.70
Proportion of non-ag income 0.41 0.32 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.14 **
Hours of leisure (TV and radio) 4.55 4.60 -0.05 0.17 -0.42 0.26
Hours of leisure (TV, radio, socializing, and others) 9.41 7.86 1.54 0.29 0.97 2.10 **
[ 95% Conf Interval ] Mean ATT S.E.
 
** Denotes significance at a 95 percent level of confidence 
Note: Standard errors are based on 10,000 iterations of the two-step matching procedure. See Appendix B for a 
description of  the variables. 
 
6. Conclusions 
The passage of the Law of Electric Concessions (DL 25844) in November 1992 set the stage for 
a comprehensive reform of Peru’s electric sector. Reinforcing the subsidiary role of the state, the 
new operating and institutional frameworks sought to maximize efficiency and enhance 
competition in all electricity activities. Those frameworks, while promoting the system’s 
interconnectivity, provided for a vertical unbundling of the sector that segmented the power 
generation, transmission, and distribution activities, and defined free competition and regulated 
markets.  
Of the three large segments—generation, transmission, and distribution—the generation 
segment operates under perfect competition and can be conducted by private and public 
enterprises. Within the transmission segment, the main network system is operated by a private 
operator under a 30-year concession scheme with the government. Other secondary transmission 
lines are also mostly private but the government participates with some investments.  
The distribution segment consists of a mixture of public and private providers and is 
mostly regulated, given its characteristics as a natural monopoly. Currently, based on the number 
of clients served, electricity distribution is 47 percent private. The presence of private and public   37
providers offered a unique opportunity to evaluate the impact of public versus private provision 
within the same country.   
Our results can be summarized as follows: first, there is a significant improvement in the 
quality of the provision of electricity when distribution firms are managed by the private sector. 
This result is consistent with solid work that supports the proposition that privatization improves 
the operating and financial performance of firms (Galal et al., 1994; La Porta and López-de-
Silanes, 1999; and the studies summarized in D’Souza and Megginson, 1999)  
Secondly, improvements in the quality and supply of electricity provision yield some 
efficiency gains in terms of the time allocation of the working labor force that can be directly 
linked to the use of electricity. Rural households under private provision of electricity had more 
opportunities to work in non-farm activities, and as a result, the share of non-farm activities 
increased, indicating both a substitution effect and a potential price effect. The substitution effect 
implies a reduction of hours spent on farm activities in favor of non-farm activities and the price 
effect implies that households will receive higher salaries and therefore will need to work fewer 
hours in total. As a result, the increase in time spent on non-farm activities was accompanied by 
a reduction of hours spent on farm activities and an increase in the hours spent on leisure. 
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(thousands of US$) 
                                  
Private  Companies  1994  1995 1996 1997 1998  1999  2000  2001 2002  2003  2004 
Electrical partnership Villacuri S.A.C (Coelvisa)                 281  856  36,591  491  180  568 
Edelnor  9,021 23,889 53,642 56,848 30,900 41,037 36,000 40,011  30,160 22,213 18,722
Electro Pangoa                    24            
Electro sur medio  1,234* 5,788*  10,318* 3,330  4,169 2,487 3,356 1,847  935  586  236 
Ede Cañete                    222  239  509  458  1,588 
Electro Paramonga                 17  13  2         
Electro Tocache                    160     85      
Electro Utcubamba        12  9  9  37  133            
Luz del sur  19,854 34,628  44,516  39,342  41,203 28,805 26,900 29,419  32,841 24,802 30,507
Public Companies                                 
Electro  centro  7,337 11,849 17,145 6,522  1,285** 1,190** 20,337** 2,232**          
Electro noroeste  10,700 10,705  12,108  19,868  11,467**  11,192** 4,478**  1,605**        
Electro norte medio  4,819  16,692  4,796  1,239  1,196**  n.a.   28,761** 4,799**        
Electro norte   8,134  2,493  10,362  4,692  4,179** 2,379** 1,878** 1,970**          
Electro Oriente  1,205  677  9,952  5,902  9,298 8,135 2,339 7,706  2,338      851 
Electro Puno                    1,161  16  482  1,208  204 
Electro Sur Este  6,264  48,943  17,612  22,375  26,387 16,793 2,314  2,541 2,628  2,700  2,588 
Electro Ucayali                 1,122  1,363  559  337  93   
Electro sur  1,211  998  3,856  2,857  1,957 1,093 1,293 999  1,537  1,279  1,150 
Chavimochic                    351            
Electrical services Rioja                    5     1     28 
SEAL  3,621  6,737 8,959 8,477 44,526 6,931 7,262 3,845  5,549  4,033  4,131 
Total 73,400 163,399 193,278 171,461 176,576  121,499 139,206 134,381 77,893 57,552 60,573
Private Investments  28,875 58,517  98,170  99,529  90,239 87,425 123,118  118,715 65,021 48,239 21,114
Percentage of private investments  39.3%  35.8%  50.8% 58.0% 51.1%  72.0%  88.4%  88.3% 83.5%  83.8%  34.9% 
 
*Property of the state / **Private property.  
Source: MEM 
   45
Appendix B 
Description of Variables 
 
Variable Description 
    
Welfare    
  Household per capita 
expenditure 
Includes expenditures on energy sources (electricity, kerosene, candles, 
dry cell batteries, car batteries, liquefied petroleum gas, solar home 
system, firewood, animal dung, crop residues, electric generator set, 
charcoal, coal and others); food; expenditures for water, telephone and 
transportation; home maintenance and repair; products of personal 
hygiene; recreation activities; health care, education, transfer 
expenditures, clothing and shoes; and furniture and cooking utensils. 
 
Variable estimated in Metropolitan Lima Peruvian soles of  June 2005. 
  Total agricultural income  Includes income from self-employment in agriculture, livestock and 
fisheries; and salaried work. Salaried work was considered agricultural 
when the individual reported working in two-digit ISIC codes 1, 2 and 
5. Around 15 percent of individuals declaring salaried income did not 
report the activity they were working in. To avoid misrepresentation due 
to missing data, households with any member declaring salaried income 
but lacking information on economic activity were not considered in the 
estimations.  
 Total  non-agricultural 
income 
Includes income from business and salaried work. Salaried work was 
considered agricultural when the individual reported working in two-
digit ISIC codes 1, 2 and 5. Around 15 percent of individuals declaring 
salaried income did not report the activity they were working in. To 
avoid misrepresentation due to missing data, households with any 
member declaring salaried income but lacking information on economic 
activity were not considered in the estimations. 
  Proportion of non-
agricultural income 
Ratio of total non-agricultural income to non-agricultural income plus 
agricultural income.  
  Daily hours of work (1)  Sum of daily hours of work in agricultural and non-agricultural activities 
of head of household and spouse. Variable is only calculated for married 
households (i.e. with information for BOTH head and spouse).  
 
Hours of agricultural work include farming, gardening, animal grazing, 
fishing, etc. Non-agricultural work includes employment in shop, 
production of handicrafts and others; processing food; repairing clothes, 
basket, machineries, equipment, etc.  
  Daily hours of work (2)  Sum of daily hours of work in household chores, agricultural activities 
and non-agricultural activities of head of household and spouse. 
Variable is only calculated for married households (i.e. with information 
for BOTH head and spouse). 
 
Household chores include: preparing meals; fetching water; washing 
clothes; house cleaning; and shopping. Agricultural work includes 
farming, gardening, animal grazing, fishing, etc. Non-agricultural work 
includes employment in shop, production of handicrafts and others; 
processing food; repairing clothes, basket, machineries, equipment, etc. 
 %  of  non-agricultural 
hours of work (1) 
Daily hours of non-agricultural work as a proportion of daily hours of 
work (agricultural and non-agricultural hours of work). Variable is only 
calculated for married households (i.e., with information for BOTH head 
and spouse).   46
 %  of  non-agricultural 
hours of work (2) 
Daily hours of non-agricultural work as a proportion of daily hours of 
work (agricultural hours of work, non-agricultural hours of work and 
household chores). Variable is only calculated for married households 
(i.e., with information for BOTH head and spouse). 
  Hours of leisure 1  Hours spent by households resting, watching TV, or listening to the 
radio. Variable is only calculated for married households (i.e., with 
information for BOTH head and spouse). 
  Hours of leisure 2  Hours spent by households resting, watching TV, listening to the radio, 
visiting neighbors, socializing, entertaining guests, and engaging in 
other leisure activities. Variable is only calculated for married 
households (i.e., with information for BOTH head and spouse). 
    
Electricity   
  Expenditure in electricity 
as % of total expenditure  
Expenditure in electricity as a percentage of total household 
expenditure.  
  Expenditure in electricity 
as % of total expenditure 
in energy 
Energy sources include: electricity; kerosene; candles; dry cell batteries; 
car batteries; liquefied petroleum gas; solar home system; firewood; 
animal dung and crop residues (hours of dung and residue collection 
were valued using urban/rural hourly wages for each department, 
reported in ENAHO 2004), electric generator set, charcoal, coal, and 
others.  
  Sources of energy  Number of sources of energy used by household from among 14options: 
(1) electricity, (2) kerosene, (3) candles, (4) dry cell batteries, (5) car 
batteries, (6) liquefied petroleum gas, (7) solar home system, (8) 
firewood, (9) animal dung, (10) crop residues, (11) electric generator 
set, (12) charcoal, (13) coal, and (14) others. 
  Price   Soles/kw paid by household. Survey provides three options for reporting 
expenditure in electricity: Households paying a flat rate or by number of 
electrical appliances/light bulbs report their constant monthly payment. 
In the case of households paying per kw consumed, pollster requests 
their last three electricity bills. If respondents cannot show these bills, 
pollster asks for the approximate average payment of electricity during 
the 12 months previous to the survey.  
 
Price can only be estimated when respondents show their bills (which 
include their payment and the number of Kw consumed).  
  Failures   Number of 30-minutes-or-more failures during the month previous to 
the survey. 
  Hours without electricity  Number of hours without electricity due to cuts or blackouts during the 
month previous to the survey. 
  Dimming in electricity 
service 
Proportion of households reporting frequent dimming in electricity 
service.  
    
Characteristics of town   
  Access to phone  Information taken from the INEI’s Pre census 1999-2000. Public 
telephone available in town.  
  Type of road  Information taken from the INEI’s Pre census 1999-2000. Main type of 
road communicating the town with the capital of district. Roads are 
classified in two categories: (1) caminos carrozables, caminos de 
herradura, trocha, rivers, and others; and (2) paved and afirmada roads  
  Secondary school   Information taken from the INEI’s Pre census 1999-2000. Secondary 
school available in town. 
  Quintile of population  Towns in the sample were classified in quintiles according to population 
reported in INEI’s Pre census 1999-2000.  
  Region  Coast, Sierra, and Jungle.   47
Characteristics of household    
  Household size   Number of members of household 
  Composition   Proportion of members 0-6, 7-14, 15-60, and 60 years or older. 
  Ethnicity   Self-reported ethnicity of household head among seven options:  (1) 
native quechua, (2) native aymara, (3) native amazonico, (4) African-
Peruvian; (5) Asian origin; (6) Caucasian; (7) Mestizo (cross breed) 
  Sex of head of household  Male or female head of household  
  Education of head of 
household 
Years of education of head of household 
  Water supply in dwelling  Three possibilities for water supply used for drinking and cooking: (1) 
supply through public network; (2) well, pylon, or others; (3) river, 
springs, lakes, etc. 
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Appendix C 
Balance of Variables in Common Support in Different Methods of Propensity Score Matching a/. 
(Nearest neighbor matching, caliper = 0.05) 
 
Control Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment
Household characteristics
Household size (members) 4.19 4.36
** 4.33 4.33 4.45 4.31
* 4.23 4.31
Porportion 6-13 y.o. 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17
Porportion 14-60 y.o. 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.58 0.57 0.58 0.59 0.58
Porportion 60 yrs or older 0.14 0.16
* 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16
Indigenous HH head 0.45 0.19
*** 0.18 0.19
* 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.18
Household with pipeline water 0.54 0.59
*** 0.58 0.59 0.60 0.59 0.64 0.67
*
Other sources of water access 0.16 0.13
** 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.14
** 0.14 0.11
**
Water from river, lake, etc 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.17 0.15
Years of education of HH head 7.07 6.97 6.94 6.99 6.98 7.00 7.11 7.35
Age of household head 48.91 50.91
*** 50.65 50.82 51.03 50.68 51.69 51.19
Female head of household 0.14 0.18
*** 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.15 0.16
Town characteristics
Paved road in town 0.63 0.61 0.68 0.61
*** 0.67 0.62
*** e/.
























Obs 1188 1483 1476 1476 1437 1437 906 906
Unmatched 
sample
PS Match - 
household 
b/.








a/. For detailed definition of variables, please see Appendix B. 
b/. Probit regression includes household variables. 
c/. Probit regression includes household and town variables. 
d/.First stage: towns with same characteristics (roads, public phone, quintile of population, secondary school, and region). 
    Second stage: propensity score matching within households in comparable towns. 
e/. By definition, town variables are the same in the two-step matching. 
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Appendix D 
Summary Statistics of Performance, Quality of Service and Welfare Indicators 
(unmatched) 
Mean Obs Mean Obs
Exp in electricity (% of exp in energy) 0.48 1473 0.47 1186 0.01
Exp in electricity (% of total exp) 0.05 1483 0.05 1188 0.00
Number of sources of electricity 2.83 1483 3.09 1188 -0.26 **
Price per Kw 1.00 499 1.08 293 -0.08
Number of monthly failures (30+ min) 1.30 1408 1.32 1073 -0.02
Often dimming in elect service 0.11 1483 0.13 1188 -0.03 **
Monthly hours of blackouts 4.59 1312 5.62 1028 -1.03 **
Hours of work - HH 10.90 1061 12.54 876 -1.64 **
Hours of work - HH (incl chores) 17.27 1061 19.16 876 -1.89 **
Prop of non-ag hours of work - HH 0.49 1012 0.39 859 0.09 **
Prop of non-ag hours of work - HH  (incl chores) 0.29 1057 0.25 876 0.04 **
Hours of work - indiv (incl chores) 5.45 2168 6.26 1799 -0.81 **
Hours of work - indiv 8.63 2168 9.59 1799 -0.96 **
Prop of non-ag hours of work - indiv 0.50 1727 0.42 1605 0.08 **
Prop of non-ag hours of work - indiv (incl chores) 0.27 2097 0.25 1775 0.02 **
Per capita expenditure 217.25 1447 198.24 1147 19.01 **
Proportion of non-ag income 0.40 906 0.33 823 0.07 **
Hours of leisure (TV and radio) 4.42 876 4.17 1061 0.24 **





a/. The table presents the unmatched means of interest variables in Tables 11, 12 and 13. 
** denotes significance at a 95% level of confidence. 
For variable definitions, please see Appendix B. 
 